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MOTHER NATURE NEEDS HER SOX: REVIEWING THE
IMPETUS AND GOALS OF THE INCREASED FINANCIAL
REGULATIONS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND




As climate change and natural disasters appear to be increasingly
prevalent across the United States, the question of how to respond to these
threats looms large. Arguably, the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) represents the tip of that responding spear. The agency, literally
dedicated to protecting the environment, is positioned to drive industry
environmental standards, set sustainable metrics, and even determine
thresholds for habitable life.
Looks can be deceiving, though. This Note examines the current
state of the EPA, and the minimal effect it currently has on penalizing
and deterring industry environmental degradation. It specifically focuses
on a number of high-profile use cases of industry pollution, and the
EPA’s response. Based on the apparent impotence of those responses,
this Note then draws a direct parallel to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) during the late nineties and early aughts, before the
Sarbanes-Oxley act was passed.
The corporate incentives of violating the EPA standards today
directly parallel the incentives of businesses committing securities fraud
back then. In short, there lacked a sufficient deterrent to counterbalance
the incentives of increasing shareholder value through any means (even
illegal ones).
After the financial world was rocked with the repeated scandals
of corporations like Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, etc., Congress responded by
passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Act has three key objectives that
resonate with today’s EPA: 1) clearer accountability; 2) expanded criminal
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; BS Accounting and Informa-
tion Systems, Drake University, 2014, summa cum laude. The author would like to thank
his long-suffering wife for her continual remunerative support.
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liability; and 3) enhanced criminal penalties. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
worked because it drove accountability into the executive boardroom.
The final piece of this Note replicates the model of Sarbanes-
Oxley and examines the implications of a similar act in the context of the
EPA through the same use cases detailed above. While the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was directed to protecting shareholder value, the EPA equiva-
lent would have an even broader mandate, protecting the world itself.
INTRODUCTION
On December 2, 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
was officially established under the watchful gaze of Republican Presi-
dent Richard Nixon.1 The EPA’s mission was “to protect human health
by safeguarding the air we breathe, water we drink and land on which
we live.”2 Today, half a century later, that mission remains alive.3 Given
this remarkable consistency, one could be forgiven for wondering why the
EPA is, if not ineffective, not more effective.4
Despite regulatory inroads in many key environmental areas, the
EPA’s success appears limited.5 Incidents like the Oroville Dam crisis in
California and lead-contaminated, drinking water in Flint, Michigan
highlight the need for an estimated $655 billion minimum investment
into drinking and wastewater infrastructure over the next twenty years.6
Meanwhile, severe weather and fires cost the federal government an es-
timated $357 billion in direct costs alone over the past ten years.7 Further,
1 Milestones in EPA and Environmental History, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/history/
milestones-epa-and-environmental-history [https://perma.cc/GST6-RCNT] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2020).
2 Id.
3 Our Mission and What We Do, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and
-what-we-do [https://perma.cc/GE6V-BFWH] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (“The mission of
EPA is to protect human health and the environment.”); see also EPA Working Together
FY 2018–2022 U.S. EPA Strategic Plan, EPA (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production
/files/2019-09/documents/fy-2018-2022-epa-strategic-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2U3-ZF2P].
4 See, e.g., U.S.GOV’TACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-722T, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
STATUS OF GAO RECOMMENDATIONS TO EPA 5 (2016) (“As of May 23, 2016, EPA had
implemented 174 of the 325 recommendations [GAO] made in fiscal year 2006 through
fiscal year 2015, and the recommendations fall into six broad categories that relate to
EPA programs and operations.”).
5 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970) (an example of a regulatory inroad
the EPA has leveraged).
6 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-559, DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER
INFRASTRUCTURE 1, 15 (2016).
7 U.S.GOV’TACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-223, CLIMATECHANGEANALYSIS OF REPORTED
FEDERAL FUNDING 12 (2018); but see Anthony Leiserowitz et al., Climate Change in the
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“[i]n 2018 alone, there were fourteen separate billion-dollar weather and
climate disaster events across the United States, with a total cost of at
least $91 billion. . . .”8 Moving from financial cost to human health, the
EPA reports that over half of the nationally assessed rivers and streams
in America are “impaired,” along with seventy percent of assessed lakes,
reservoirs, and ponds.9 It would seem, at least arguable, that the organi-
zation tasked with “[protecting] human health and the environment”
should be addressing these issues.10
Further, this ineffectiveness cannot be attributed to a lack, or wan-
ing, of public interest. According to one recent survey, the environment
was cited as a top-ten policy priority for United States adults in 2019,
while another study found that “[a] majority of Americans are worried
about harm from extreme events in their local area including extreme heat
(69%), droughts (64%), flooding (60%), and/or water shortages (59%).”11
Belying this apparent popularity, the EPA’s budget has, on average, only
increased by an average of 2.18% annually from 2009 to 2019, barely out-
pacing average annual inflation during the same time period.12 Public
support, it would seem, is not enough to address its mandate.
In addition to budgeting concerns, the EPA has been effectively
hamstrung from both external and internal forces. Externally, lobbying
firms have had an immense amount of influence on the passage of envi-
ronmentally conscious bills.13 Further, this lobbying appears exceedingly
American Mind, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION (2019), https://cli
matecommunication.yale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Climate_Change_American
_Mind_April_2019c.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RLC-XV23] (Only “[a]bout four in ten Americans
[(38%)] think people in the United States are being harmed ‘right now’ by global warming.”).
8 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-625T, CLIMATE CHANGE OPPORTUNITIES TO
REDUCE FEDERAL FISCAL EXPOSURE 1 (2019).
9 Summary of Water Quality Assessments for Each Waterbody Type, EPA(Nov. 10, 2020),
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control#total_assessed_waters
[https://perma.cc/6RC7-EJDT]; see About the Online ATTAINS Separate Impaired and
Assessed Waters Reports, EPA (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/waterdata/about-on
line-attains-separate-impaired-and-assessed-waters-reports (“A [waterbody] is considered
‘impaired’ if any one of its assessed uses is not met.”).
10 Our Mission and What We Do, supra note 3.
11 Pew Rsch. Ctr., Public’s 2019 Priorities: Economy, Health Care, Education and Security
All Near Top of List (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/01/24/publics
-2019-priorities-economy-health-care-education-and-security-all-near-top-of-list/ [https://
perma.cc/C8KR-B346]; Leiserowitz et al., supra note 7, at 4.
12 EPA’s Budget and Spending, Planning, Budget, and Results, EPA (June 24, 2020), https://
www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget [https://perma.cc/RV9T-TVH7]; Current US Inflation
Rates: 2009–2020, USINFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.usinflationcalcu lator.com/in
flation/current-inflation-rates/ [https://perma.cc/FT4S-BHCJ] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
13 See, e.g., Kyle C. Meng & Ashwin Rode, The Social Cost of Lobbying over Climate Policy,
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one-sided, as exemplified by one recent study that noted interested cor-
porations were the primary actors in most climate change lobbying (as
opposed to environmental organizations).14 While free to infer otherwise,
it seems unlikely that the changes being lobbied for by these corporations
are strengthening the EPA, or furthering its mission.
Internally, the EPA has also not been inured to partisanship. In
May of 1981, Anne Gorsuch Burford became Administrator of the EPA.15
Credited with cutting the EPA’s budget by twenty-two percent, Ms.
Gorsuch is alleged to have boasted “she reduced the thickness of the book
of clean water regulations from six inches to a half-inch.”16 Unwittingly
blazing a trail that would be followed today, her refusal to cooperate in an
investigation into her agency’s adherence to the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Liability and Compensation Act (“CERCLA”), led to her
being the first agency director cited for contempt of Congress.17 Scott Pruitt,
a more recent example, acted as President Donald Trump’s EPA adminis-
trator from February 17, 2017 until July 6, 2018.18 His time as head of an
agency striving to “protect human health and the environment” was
marked with opposition to the Clean Power Plan, deregulated fuel emis-
sions standards, suspension of the Clean Water Rule, and a shrinking of
the EPA’s footprint, among others.19
9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 472, 472 (2019) (finding that “lobbying lowered the proba-
bility of enacting the Waxman-Markey [cap-and-trade] bill by 13 percentage points,
representing an expected social cost of US$60 billion (in 2018 [US] dollars)”).
14 Robert J. Brulle, The Climate Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis of Lobbying Spending on
Climate Change in the USA, 2000 to 2016, 149 CLIMATIC CHANGE 289, 289, 298 (2018)
(“[C]orporations with direct interest in the outcomes of climate legislation are the pri-
mary . . . actors engaged in climate-related lobbying. While environmental organizations and
the renewable energy sector also have major direct interests . . . they are relatively minor
players in . . . lobbying at the federal level.”).
15 Phil Wisman, EPA History (1970–1985), EPA (Nov. 1985), https://archive.epa.gov/epa
/aboutepa/epa-history-1970-1985.html [https://perma.cc/A7CU-UTS6].
16 Patricia Sullivan, Anne Gorsuch Burford, 62, Dies; Reagan EPA Director, WASH. POST
(July 22, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3418-2004Jul21.html
[https://perma.cc/6682-XKGL].
17 Philip Shabecoff, House Charges Head of E.P.A. with Contempt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17,
1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/17/us/house-charges-head-of-epa-with-contempt
.html [https://perma.cc/AP4S-FPHB].
18 Rebecca Hersher & Brett Neely, Scott Pruitt out at EPA, NPR (July 5, 2018), https://
www.npr.org/2018/07/05/594078923/scott-pruitt-out-at-epa [https://perma.cc/59YR-M86U];
Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmental-protection
-agency.html [https://perma.cc/Q94L-GYLW].
19 Our Mission and What We Do, supra note 3; Daniel Bush & Joey Mendolia, All of the
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Even when the EPA is not facing dismantling from within, it is
hard to argue its regulations are successfully acting as viable deterrents.
As an example, consider the EPA announcement, in September of 2019,
that it reached a settlement with Hyundai to pay $47 million as a civil
penalty for violations of the Clean Air Act.20 The EPA and United States
Department of Justice representatives hailed this settlement as “holding
Hyundai accountable” and emphasized that they “will not tolerate such
schemes that skirt the Clean Air Act, designed by Congress to improve
air quality.”21 This hard-nosed sentiment seems at odds with the reality
that in 2018 Hyundai reported sales of w96.8 trillion (Korean Won), the
equivalent of about $81.7 billion U.S. dollars.22 To put that in perspec-
tive, Hyundai’s alleged introduction of over 2,000 illegal diesel nonroad
vehicles into the United States is worth, under the EPA’s settlement,
barely over one half of one percent of their total sales.23 Sidestepping the
debate of what an appropriate percentage would be to deter this conduct,
it seems reasonable, at least, that a number in imminent danger of being
quantified as zero under a rounding error would not qualify.
In short, the EPA can no longer be considered an effective instru-
ment. It would appear incapable of facing the realities of modern-day
environmental issues due to both internal and external failings. Its regu-
lations have moved from a deterrence to simply a cost of doing business,
addressed reactively.
However, this is not the first time a federal agency has been ap-
parently powerless to enforce its mandate. In the late 1990s and early
2000s, the financial industry was reeling from repeated high-profile scan-
dals involving corporate fraud.24 Responding to these scandals, Senator
Ways Scott Pruitt Changed Energy Policy, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 5, 2018), https://www
.pbs.org/newshour/nation/all-of-the-ways-embattled-epa-chief-scott-pruitt-has-changed
-energy-policy [https://perma.cc/Z7LN-W33F].
20 EPA Press Off., EPA and DOJ Reach Clean Air Settlement with Hyundai for Engines and




22 CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME (FOR THE YEARS ENDED DEC. 31, 2018 AND 2017),
HYUNDAI MOTOR CO., Annual Report (Form 10-k) (Mar. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Hyundai
Ann. Rep.].
23 EPA Press Off., supra note 20; Hyundai Ann. Rep., supra note 22.
24 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275 (2002) (discussing the Enron scandal); Joshua Kennon, The Worldcom Scandal
Explained, THE BALANCE (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/worldcom-s-magic
-trick-356121 [https://perma.cc/KRH7-MY3Z]; see generally William H. Donaldson, Testimony
Concerning Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Before the Senate Committee
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Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael Oxley sponsored the now
eponymous Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was signed into law on July 30,
2002.25 The Act is comprised of eleven titles designed to enhance the ac-
countability of publicly traded companies, and protect investors.26 Among
those titles were three key objectives: 1) clearer accountability; 2) expanded
criminal liability; and 3) enhanced criminal penalties.27 By enhancing the
enforcement powers of the SEC, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act hoped to
strengthen proactive deterrence, instead of reacting to scandals after the
damage had been done.28
The convergence of increasing environmental costs and height-
ened public awareness juxtaposed against the current impotence of the
EPA regulations are paralleled in the events that led to the passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which, at that time, enjoyed widespread support
across the aisle.29 The time has come for another watershed bipartisan
moment: the environmental equivalent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Just
as financial scandals drove the passage of that bill, so now should the
environmental scandals of today and yesterday drive the passage of a
new bill. Realizing that even the long arms of a governmental mandate
have no power over the capricious environment, the EPA must be armed
not with regulatory ripostes, but with deterrents. Deterrents whose aim
is directed squarely at corporations responsible for environmental degra-
dation.30 Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a model, this new policy should
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, SEC.EXCH.COMM’N (Sept. 9, 2003), https://www.sec
.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm [https://perma.cc/M8D9-ELZP] (testimony of William
H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Testimony Concerning Implementation].
25 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter
Sarbanes-Oxley Act]; see H.R. 3763 (107th): Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, GOVTRACK, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/hr3763 [https://perma.cc/VW5T-UYQ4] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2020).
26 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 25; see also Sarbanes-Oxley, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SMALL
BUSINESS 1000–02 (Arsen J. Darnay & Monique D. Magee eds., 3d ed. 2007) (providing brief
summary of each title).
27 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 25 (titles III, VIII, IX, and XI).
28 Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 24 (“The Act also provided welcome
new enforcement tools to combat corporate fraud, punish corporate wrongdoers and deter
fraud with the threat of stiffer penalties. The [SEC], both on its own and in conjunction
with the President’s inter-agency Corporate Task Force, is moving decisively to utilize
these new tools to expose and punish acts of corruption, improve corporate responsibility
and protect America’s investors.”).
29 H.R. 3763 (107th): Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 25 (initially passing the
house 334–90, and an updated draft passing the senate 99–0).
30 See, e.g., Tess Riley, Just 100 Companies Responsible for 71% of Global Emissions, Study
Says, THEGUARDIAN (July 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business
/2017/jul/10/100-fossil-fuel-companies-investors-responsible-71-global-emissions-cdp
2021] MOTHER NATURE NEEDS HER SOX 607
contain three guiding tenets: 1) clearer and stronger corporate account-
ability regarding environmental hazards; 2) enhanced criminal liability
for environmental failures; and 3) expanded criminal liability for envi-
ronmental failures.
I. HISTORY AND IMPETUS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, public corporations
were primarily regulated by the Securities Act of 1933.31 Complementing
that regulation was the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created
the SEC.32 These acts created multiple obligations on corporations in-
cluding requiring publishing financial information regarding publicly
traded securities.33 As noted by the SEC itself, “[financial disclosures
enable] investors . . . to make informed judgments about whether to
purchase a company’s securities [and] [w]hile the SEC requires that the
information provided be accurate, it does not guarantee it.”34 The goal of
these regulations was honesty and transparency to enable investors to
make informed decisions about the securities they would purchase.35 As
part of this, public corporations were required to be honest in their financial
disclosures, which included the corporation, its investment bank, and
also its audited financial statements.36 In short, the corporations were
effectively on the honor system to tell the truth. Additionally, while theo-
retically anyone who signed off on an inaccurate statement was civilly
liable, this was undercut by a number of exceptions.37 These exceptions
meant that proving specific individuals were at fault was difficult, and
so the minimal personal risk of “cooking the books” might be overshadowed
by the potential benefits. To analogize, this situation would be akin to the
captain of a sailing vessel being incentivized to find a faster waterway,
sinking her craft in the attempt, and everyone subsequently agreeing to
blame the ship.
-study-climate-change [https://perma.cc/7BVB-GZJP] (demonstrating an example of why
the focus of this legislation should be on corporations, not on individual humans).
31 Securities Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38, Stat. 74; see also The Laws That Govern the
Securities Industry, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml
.html [https://perma.cc/L9A3-RH9R].





37 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (“[N]o person, other than the issuer, shall be liable provided therein
who shall sustain the burden of proof” they had already resigned, they had notified the
SEC, and/or they believed the statements were true and were not misleading).
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The balance of this system would appear to reach its breaking
point in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when multiple high-profile com-
panies were embroiled in scandal. As summarized by the former SEC
Chairman William H. Donaldson:
The mid-1990s saw the beginning of the full flourish of the
so-called “new economy” in America. The stock market
reflected the enormity of the changes taking place in the
economy . . . [and] brought millions of individuals with
their savings into our stock markets for the first time.
Starting in the second quarter of 2000, the bubble
burst. Stock prices plummeted. . . . As happened after the
crash of 1929, the falling market that began in 2000 led to
other revelations. Starting with the unfolding of the Enron
story in October 2001, it became apparent that the boom
years had been accompanied by fraud, other misconduct
and a serious erosion in business principles. The low points
in this story are now household names—not just Enron,
but also WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia and others. . . .
In addition to the grossest displays of greed and
malfeasance, there were other more subtle but still perni-
cious developments. During the boom years, corporate
America increasingly emphasized a short-term focus, fueled
by an obsession with quarter-to-quarter earnings.38
Enron is perhaps the most well-known of the financial scandals.39 An
energy trading company, it was created in 1985 from a merger.40 Capital-
izing on deregulation of the energy markets, Enron quickly catapulted
into being a financial juggernaut, with shares peaking at over ninety
dollars.41 In August of 2000, Enron was the seventh largest firm in
America by market capitalization.42 Solidifying Enron’s apparent Midas
38 Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 24.
39 Id.
40 Troy Segal, Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/ [https://perma.cc/5MX3-ASS4]
(last updated Sept. 22, 2020); C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J. ACCT.
(Apr. 1, 2002), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2002/apr/theriseandfallofen
ron.html [https://perma.cc/X5WP-3QBD]; see also CNN Editorial Research, Enron Fast
Facts, CNN (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/us/enron-fast-facts/index
.html [https://perma.cc/XC6J-REX9].
41 Segal, supra note 40; Thomas, supra note 40.
42 Bratton, supra note 24, at 1276.
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touch, Fortune Magazine even named it America’s most innovative firm,
five years in a row.43 However, by 2001 the company’s shares were under
a dollar, and it had declared bankruptcy.44 In the aftermath of its col-
lapse, it was estimated that shareholders’ losses totaled $74 billion, and
that Enron had been overstating its earnings since at least 1997.45 How
could such a high profile organization, employing so many intelligent
people, perpetuate such extensive fraud?46 While individual motives can
only be speculated at, it seems clear that the financial incentives of
success undercut any moral moorings that should have prevented this.47
In short, there was no compelling reason not to do this.
While Enron’s bankruptcy represented the largest in American
history at that time, it was only the tip of the proverbial iceberg.48 Ap-
proximately one year later, WorldCom would follow in Enron’s ignominious
footsteps, becoming the new largest bankruptcy in history.49 WorldCom’s
story sounded like a bad retelling of Enron’s. It had fraudulently catego-
rized over $3.8 billion in operating expenses as capital expenditures,
creating the illusion of profits by improperly spreading annual expenses
over multiple years.50 WorldCom’s disclosure led to its stock dropping
from “a high of $65 per share to pennies.”51 Once again, individuals in a
company saw the benefits of fraud outweigh the risks and left innocent
shareholders to pick up the tab.52
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1276–77.
45 Segal, supra note 40; see also Enron Fast Facts, supra note 40.
46 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 613–47 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (describing
the scheme); Segal, supra note 40 (discussing how Enron manipulated its financials to
hide its debt from investors and creditors).
47 In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 633 (“Lead Plaintiff describes Enron’s ‘corporate cul-
ture’ as characterized by ‘a fixation on the price of Enron stock’ and on pushing that price
ever higher. . . . Corporate managers and executives were compensated for closing trans-
actions and placing high values on them, regardless of the economic realities of the deals,
to generate profit when ‘marked to market.’ There was pressure to do anything necessary
to make the numbers, and it was common knowledge that revenues and earnings were
being falsified at the direction of top executives. Bonuses went to those who facilitated
the company-wide fraudulent behavior.”).
48 Bratton, supra note 24, at 1276.
49 Luisa Beltran, WorldCom Files Largest Bankruptcy Ever, CNNMONEY (July 22, 2002),
https://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/news/worldcom_bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/CBS6
-ERNP].
50 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 400–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., id. at 402 (“Ebbers’s personal financial situation provided a strong motive for
materially misstating WorldCom’s earnings.”).
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Adelphia and Tyco, the two other examples alluded to by the former
SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson, further demonstrated how skewed
the values of America’s executives had become.53 Tyco’s CEO and CFO
were indicted, and convicted, of stealing over $600 million from the com-
pany and misleading shareholders, “drawing on Tyco’s treasury, as they
saw fit. . . .”54 Adelphia, formerly one of the largest cable television pro-
viders in the country, was a similar story.55 The SEC charged the Rigas
family, owners of Adelphia, with excluding over $2.3 billion in debt from
their financial statements, among other attempts, to make the business
appear soluble.56 Once again, this multiyear fraud left innocent sharehold-
ers stuck holding the equity in another company without real value.57
In each of these cases, the fraud was perpetuated by one or more
individuals. Corporations cannot falsify records or conceal debt, only
people working for those corporations can. Whatever rules were in place
to stop those people, they clearly lacked the strength to disincentivize.
This is where the Sarbanes-Oxley Act comes in. Its “sweeping
reforms” both empowered the SEC, and created a chilling effect on would-
be fraud.58 Consider Section 906, which requires that corporate executives
must personally certify the accuracy of financial statements and risk
facing jail time if the SEC later finds those statements included viola-
tions.59 By taking criminal liability, and having it apply to individuals
within the company instead of simply the company as a whole, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act arguably represents a strong disincentivizing effect
that must be weighed when executives consider the benefits of fraud
today. This effect is exactly what an environmental equivalent to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act should capture, a legitimate deterrence that would
give executives pause when weighing their corporate objectives.
53 See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 24.
54 People v. Kozlowski, 47 A.D. 3d 111, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); see also Three Tyco Execs
Indicted for Fraud, CNN BUSINESS (Sept. 12, 2002), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/BUSI
NESS/asia/09/12/us.tyco/ [https://perma.cc/KK97-XZKS]; Associated Press, Ex-Tyco Execu-
tives Get up to 25 Years in Prison, NBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.nbcnews.com
/id/9399803/ns/business-corporate_scandals/t/ex-tyco-executives-get-years-prison/#.X3
Y1ce0pAuV [https://perma.cc/D8P2-QPFZ].
55 United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2007).
56 Press Release, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Charges Adelphia and Rigas Family With
Massive Financial Fraud (July 24, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-110.htm
[https://perma.cc/V28V-PGRE].
57 Rigas, 490 F.3d at 212 (“Adelphia’s stock price plummeted by about twenty-five percent
to $20.39; by the time the stock was delisted in May 2002, the price per share was $1.16.
The company filed for bankruptcy in June 2002, wiping out all shareholder value.”).
58 See Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 24.
59 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 25.
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While the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley may have represented a depar-
ture from previous securities regulation, it must be noted that the effi-
cacy of this Act has not been above dispute. In a commencement address
in 2005, then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan stated his
approval of the Act and the values it represented.60 However, others were
not so enamored. The Act has been criticized as substantially increasing
the cost of compliance, disincentivizing people from serving as corporate
officers due to the increased liability, and generally failing to fix the
problems it was set out to solve.61 The truth appears to be somewhere in
the middle. A study on the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley conducted a decade
after its passage noted:
On the one hand, the law continues to be fiercely and
relentlessly attacked in the U.S., particularly in political
election battles and during legislative debates . . . On the
other hand . . . survey evidence suggests that informed
observers . . . do not believe that the Act . . . has been a
significant problem, and may well have produced net
benefits. . . .62
Unfortunately, the study then punted on the actual effects of Sarbanes-
Oxley by admitting “the state of research is such that—even after ten
years—no conclusions can be drawn about the net costs and benefits of
the Act.”63 Other analyses have come to a similar conclusion, that the
answer of Sarbanes-Oxley’s effectiveness is more nuanced than a simple
yes or no.64
60 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Commencement Address at the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania (May 15, 2005) (transcript available at https://www
.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050515/default.htm) (“[T]he act importantly
reinforced the principle that shareholders own our corporations and that corporate
managers should be working on behalf of shareholders to allocate business resources to
their optimum use.”).
61 See, e.g., William A. Niskanen, Congress Should Repeal the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CATO
INST. (Aug. 2, 2006), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/congress-should-re
peal-sarbanesoxley-act [https://perma.cc/66UG-5DLY]; Michael Arrington, Newt Gingrich:
Kill Sarbanes-Oxley Act, TechCrunch (Nov. 5, 2008), https://techcrunch.com/2008/11/05
/newt-gingrich-kill-sarbanes-oxley/ [https://perma.cc/RR69-JYUD].
62 John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan, SOX after Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review,
28 ACCT. HORIZONS 627, 627–28 (2014).
63 Id. at 628.
64 See, e.g., Kevin Drawbaugh & Dena Aubin, Analysis: A Decade on, Is Sarbanes-Oxley
Working?, REUTERS (July 30, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-sarbox
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While the discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley’s efficacy is no doubt im-
portant, I would argue that it is not prescient to an EPA equivalent.
Debates on the merits of the Act are defined by its implementation and
subsequent enforcement. They can be instructive, but do not signal the
sole path a similar act could take.65 The focus, therefore, should be on
Sarbanes-Oxley’s conceptual underpinnings as a deterrent. This is the
pole star the EPA’s “Sarbanes-Oxley Equivalent” should drive towards,
moving from a reactive agency to one that is sufficiently empowered to
deter most, if not all, environmental degradation, leaving subsequent litera-
ture to expound upon practical implementation or policy fine-tuning.
II. HISTORY AND CURRENT ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES OF THE EPA
According to the EPA, its timeline originates in September of 1962
with the publishing of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.66 The book described
how pesticides were causing mass fauna killings (thus rendering spring
“silent”).67 The next decade saw the newly created EPA spearhead an
immense number of new initiatives including the Clean Air Act of 1970,
lead-based paint restrictions (1971), defined air pollution danger levels
(1971), the banning of DDT (1972), the Clean Water Act (1972), and more.68
The list of initiatives continued to grow, and today, the EPA is tasked
with administering over thirty environmental laws and executive orders
designed to “[protect] the environment and public health.”69 Supporting
that mission across the country are both national and regional offices,
each tasked with specific duties.70
/analysis-a-decade-on-is-sarbanes-oxley-working-idUSBRE86Q1BY20120730 [https://perma
.cc/8SWC-Y9U4] (discussing both positive and negative impacts); Craig Clay & Daniel
Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley: 15 Years of Successes and Challenges, ACCT. TODAY (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/sarbanes-oxley-marks-15-years-of-successes
-and-challenges [https://perma.cc/B7VH-2ZKJ] (discussing benefits and ongoing challenges).
65 See Drawbaugh & Aubin, supra note 64 (As of 2012, “[O]nly a handful of people have faced
criminal charges . . . [while] Sarbanes-Oxley [has brought] more than 200 civil cases.”).
66 Milestones in EPA and Environmental History, supra note 1.
67 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Anniversary ed. Houghton Mifflin Co. 2002) (1962); see
also Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF RACHEL CARSON, https://
www.rachelcarson.org/SilentSpring.aspx [https://perma.cc/C33W-9JUR] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2020).
68 Milestones in EPA and Environmental History, supra note 1.
69 Laws and Executive Orders, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-ex
ecutive-orders [https://perma.cc/J3TQ-ECVV] (last updated Sept. 14, 2017).
70 EPA Organization Chart, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-organization-chart
[https://perma.cc/D36F-8VGB] (last updated July 1, 2020).
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One of these key duties is enforcement and compliance.71 Enforce-
ment and compliance is a multistep process: first, an “[e]nvironmental
problem is identified” which Congress then addresses by passing laws.72
Next, the EPA “issues regulations to implement the laws.”73 After that
the EPA engages in compliance assistance, compliance monitoring, and
enforcement actions to ensure both laws and regulations are understood
and being followed.74
The EPA has three types of enforcement actions: 1) civil adminis-
trative actions; 2) civil judicial actions; and 3) criminal actions.75 Civil
administrative actions do not involve a judicial court process, and are
more akin to just giving a party notice.76 Examples include “a notice of
violation”; “a Superfund notice letter”; and “an order . . . to come into
compliance, or to clean up a site.”77 As these orders are not backed by the
judiciary, they could be considered the weakest of the EPA’s remedies.
Stronger than civil administrative actions, civil judicial actions
are actual, formal lawsuits.78 They can range from injunctions to comply
with statutory requirements, all the way to orders to pay to clean up a
hazardous site.79 Finally, there are criminal actions, which “are usually
reserved for the most serious violations” and “can result in fines or im-
prisonment.”80 As related by the EPA, civil enforcement can result in:
“settlements,” “civil penalties,” “injunctive relief,” and/or “supplemental
environmental projects and mitigation.”81 Criminal enforcement, mean-
while, can result in fines, restitutions, and even incarceration.82
Currently, the EPA’s enforcement is heavily skewed toward civil
rather than criminal enforcement. From 2008 to 2018, the EPA initiated
more than 1,500 civil judicial and administrative cases annually.83 There
71 Basic Information on Enforcement, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/basic-infor
mation-enforcement [https://perma.cc/4BZE-X7PG] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (“Enforcing













83 OFF.ENF’T AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, Fiscal Year 2018 EPA Enf’t Compliance Ann.
614 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:601
were fewer than 400 criminal cases opened per year in the same time
period.84 However, both types of enforcement have seen year-over-year
declines.85 2018 saw approximately 2,000 fewer civil enforcement cases
initiated than a decade ago in 2008, with a clear decline each year.86
Criminal enforcement cases opened, though less expansive to begin with,
have also been reduced by more than half since 2008.87 In sum, the EPA
greatly favors civil over criminal sanctions, and both have seen a stark
decline in the last decade. However, to the EPA’s credit, “civil enforce-
ment actions are strategic to maximize compliance results, not the number
of individual actions.”88 Essentially, simply measuring the number of
cases is not an accurate measure of deterrence or compliance. So, what
is an accurate measure of compliance and deterrence?
A. Environmental Regulation as a Cost of Doing Business
This is where the parallel of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act appears. The
question of what an accurate measure of compliance and deterrence is is
answered with: not this. As Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and the others demon-
strated, whatever financial regulations that existed were not strong
enough to force employees to either comply with them, or, stated another
way, were not strong enough to deter employees from failing to comply
with them. In short, the measure of success of the EPA should not be how
much it has prevented, but correspondingly how much it has failed to
prevent. From that perspective, I would argue that the civil remedies the
EPA favors have become little more than a cost of doing business. They
do not represent a legitimate deterrence because their incursion does not
dissuade companies from pursuing environmentally degrading conduct.
III. VOLKSWAGEN’S EMISSION SCANDAL
Take Volkswagen, which, in 2016 was the subject of a complaint
stating approximately 590,000 of its diesel vehicles violated the Clean
Results (Feb. 8, 2019), at 10, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2019-02/docu
ments/fy18-enforcement-annual-results-data-graphs.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX2M-8MFY].
84 Id. at 7.
85 Id. at 7, 10.
86 Id. at 10.
87 Id. at 7.
88 Enforcement Annual Results for Fiscal Year 2017, EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/en
forcement/enforcement-annual-results-fiscal-year-2017.html [https://perma.cc/3HXT-TC2C]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
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Air Act.89 The defective vehicles, equipped with devices designed to defeat
federal emission tests, covered seven years’ worth of models.90 To address
this widespread violation, the EPA reached three partial settlements
against Volkswagen, starting in 2016 and continuing into 2017.91 The
settlements included, among other things, requiring “Volkswagen to fund
a $2.7 billion mitigation trust fund,” requiring “Volkswagen to invest $2
billion in ZEV [zero emission vehicle] charging infrastructure and in the
promotion of ZEVs,” and “a $1.45 billion civil penalty for the alleged civil
violations of the Clean Air Act.”92 For a sense of scale, “[t]he agreement
was . . . ‘the largest civil settlement in automaker history, and the largest
false advertising case the Federal Trade Commission has ever seen.’”93 In
its annual enforcement results of 2017, the EPA referenced Volkswagen’s
case, among others, as exemplary, stating, “EPA’s civil enforcement ac-
tions also deter future violations and ensure a level playing field for the
regulated community by assessing penalties, including penalties to cover
the economic benefit of noncompliance.”94 But do they?
On September 18, 2015, the EPA announced a Notice of Violation
regarding the Volkswagen Group.95 That year, Volkswagen reported post-
tax loss of approximately € 1.4 billion ($1.54 billion 2019 USD).96 Apparent
in this loss is that it occurred before any settlement with the EPA. Volks-
wagen itself, in discussing the “emissions issue” noted that “provisions
totaling € 16.2 billion [17.87 2019 USD] were recognized and charged to
operating result, primarily for pending technical modifications, for
89 Volkswagen Clean Air Act Civil Settlement, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement
/volkswagen-clean-air-act-civil-settlement [https://perma.cc/2TBR-NAPL] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2020).
90 Id. (“These settlements resolve allegations that Volkswagen violated the Clean Air Act
(‘CAA’) by the sale of approximately 590,000 model year 2009 to 2016 diesel motor
vehicles equipped with ‘defeat devices.’”).
91 Id. (“Through a series of three partial settlements, the EPA has resolved a civil enforce-
ment case against Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG, Volkswagen Group
of America, Inc., Volkswagen Group of America Chattanooga Operations, LLC, and Porsche
Cars North America, Inc. (collectively ‘Volkswagen’)”).
92 Id.
93 Merrit Kennedy, Volkswagen To Plead Guilty, Pay $4.3 Billion in Emissions Scheme
Settlement, NPR (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/11/509
318791/volkswagen-to-plead-guilty-pay-4-3-billion-in-emissions-scheme-settlement
[https://perma.cc/6TV5-2AWD] ($4.3 billion includes both civil and criminal allegations).
94 Enforcement Annual Results for Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 88.
95 Volkswagen, 2015 Ann. Rep. (Form 10-k) (Apr. 28, 2016), at 49, https://www.volks
wagenag.com/presence/investorrelation/publications/annual-reports/2016/volkswagen
/englisch/Y_2015_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWN7-LYZS].
96 Id. tbl. Financial data (IFRSs), € million.
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repurchases, and customer-related measures as well as legal risks.”97
Additionally, Volkswagen noted that “news about irregularities in the
software used in certain diesel engines and the resulting public specula-
tion about possible consequences to be expected led to a sharp fall in . . .
[stock price].”98 In essence, Volkswagen’s billion and a half dollar loss
was self-inflicted, in preparation for any potential future legal risks, as
well as market-driven by anxious shareholders. The EPA merely an-
nounced a notice of violation.
Now, consider 2016, the year of the first EPA partial settlement.
Volkswagen reported after-tax earnings of approximately € 5.4 billion
($5.96 billion 2019 USD).99 2017 and 2018 also saw after-tax year-over-
year increases to € 11.6 ($12.8 2019 USD) and € 12.2 ($13.46 2019 USD)
billion respectively.100 So, a Clean Air Act violation that involved over half
a million vehicles, spanning more than half a decade resulted in what
exactly? According to Volkswagen, it spent € 29 billion ($32 billion 2019
USD) in relation to the “diesel issue” across years 2015 to 2018.101 Note,
that number represents its spending globally, not simply confined to the
United States or the EPA. Further, it appears the majority of that was
spent preemptively.102 To summarize, 2015, the only year Volkswagen’s
after-tax earnings appear to be negative due to the “emissions issue” oc-
curred before any EPA settlement was reached. In fact, 2018, the year
after all three partial settlements were completed as well as a separate
guilty plea in Federal Court, shows Volkswagen with its highest after-tax
earnings since 2011, exceeding multiple countries’ gross domestic prod-
uct.103 Financially, it would seem hard to argue the EPA’s involvement
97 Id. at 53.
98 Id.
99 Volkswagen, 2016 Ann. Rep. (Form 10-k) (Mar. 14, 2017), Key Figures, https://www
.volkswagenag.com/presence/investorrelation/publications/annual-reports/2017/volks
wagen/en/Y_2016_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNY4-VPDS].
100 Volkswagen, 2017 Ann. Rep. (Form 10-k) (Mar. 13, 2018), Key Figures, https://www
.volkswagenag.com/presence/investorrelation/publications/annual-reports/2018
/volkswagen/en/Y_2017_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RFU-DELS]; Volkswagen, 2018 Ann.
Rep. (Form 10-k) (Mar. 12, 2019), Key Figures, https://www.volkswagenag.com/presence
/investorrelation/publications/annual-reports/2019/volkswagen/en/Y_2018_e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H9XE-337Q].
101 Volkswagen, 2018 Ann. Rep., supra note 100, at 92–94.
102 See Volkswagen, 2015 Ann. Rep., supra note 95, at 53 (“[P]rovisions totaling € 16.2
billion were recognized and charged to operating result, primarily for pending technical
modifications, for repurchases, and customer-related measures as well as legal risks.”).
103 Press Release, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal
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“deter[red] future violations and ensure[d] a level playing field for the
regulated community,” or had any direct tangible effect (setting aside
shareholder speculation).104
IV. GENERAL ELECTRIC’S CONTAMINATION OF THE HUDSON RIVER
Volkswagen is hardly alone as a company settling with the EPA
without much appreciable effect. Consider General Electric (“GE”), who,
in 2014, agreed to reimburse and fund an investigation totaling $24 million
regarding contamination of the Hudson River.105 At the same time, GE’s
2015 10k report indicated net earnings of $15 billion in 2014, making the
cost of the investigation less than one quarter of one percent of that year’s
earnings.106 While 2015 showed a loss to net earnings, this was “primar-
ily due to lower Financial Services income,” with no mention of legal suits
or settlements being a factor.107 In fact, discussing its environmental
matters, GE states “[o]ur operations . . . involve the use, disposal and
cleanup of substances regulated under environmental protection laws.
We are involved in a number of remediation actions to clean up hazard-
ous wastes” which have been accounted for in annual expenditures.108 GE
is literally disclosing that its remedial measures with the EPA are simply
a cost of doing business to be accounted for and anticipated annually—a
position that would seem irreconcilable with true deterrence.
and Civil Penalties and Six Volkswagen Executives and Employees Are Indicted in Con-
nection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests, Dep’t Just. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion
-criminal-and-civil-penalties-and [https://perma.cc/S2VP-L3CG]; Volkswagen, 2011 Ann.
Rep. (Form 10-k) (Mar. 12, 2012), Key Figures, https://www.volkswagenag.com/presence
/investorrelation/publications/annual-reports/2012/volkswagen/english/Y_2011_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y68J-6Q3X]; Basic Data Collection, U.N. (2017), https://un stats.un.org
/unsd/snaama/Basic [https://perma.cc/3642-8XU5] (comparing all countries by GPD in
U.S. dollars at current prices in the year 2017).
104 Enforcement Annual Results for Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 88.
105 Case Summary: GE Agrees to Further Investigate Upper Hudson River Floodplain in
a Comprehensive Study to Cost About $20.5 Million, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforce
ment/case-summary-ge-agrees-further-investigate-upper-hudson-river-floodplain-com
prehensive [https://perma.cc/8GWF-HAZ9] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
106 Gen. Elec., 2015 Ann. Rep. (Form 10-k) (Feb. 26, 2016), at 36, https://www.annualre
ports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/g/NYSE_GE_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc
/45BC-LBAW].
107 Id. at 31, 36.
108 Id. at 93.
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V. BP’S OIL SPILL (DEEPWATER HORIZON)
Finally, consider the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010, where
BP’s oil drilling rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico resulted in “the death
of 11 workers on the Deepwater Horizon and the largest spill of oil in the
history of marine oil drilling operations.”109 For a sense of scale, “the
Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989—the event that prompted Congress to
dramatically increase the civil penalties available under the CWA [Clean
Water Act]—was approximately 257,000 barrels, one-twelfth the size of
this spill.”110 Of the examples discussed, this is perhaps the closest the
EPA comes to true deterrence.
Widely publicized, the incident drew heavy public criticism.111 In
2015, BP agreed to pay $5.5 billion in civil penalties under the Clean Water
Act.112 Prior to that in 2012, BP reached a plea agreement for an addi-
tional $1.15 billion for criminal violations of the Clean Water Act, as well
as additional fines.113 All told, BP estimated it spent almost $67 billion from
the time of the oil spill to 2018.114 Here, finally, appears to be a serious
condemnation of an environmental disaster. That bill represents more than
BP’s 2018, 2017, and 2016 gross revenues (taken individually).115
Unfortunately, those numbers belie the truth of a commodities-
based economy. In late 2014 onward, the price of crude oil dropped by
more than fifty percent of what it cost in 2013.116 Since that time, the price
has never returned to its former zenith, in large part due to increases in
supply from the United States’ shale extraction.117 To see this in action,
109 Deepwater Horizon—BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforce
ment/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulf-mexico-oil-spill [https://perma.cc/ZQ6N-LNYL] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2020); see generally Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
& Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore
Drilling (Jan. 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf
/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/P27T-XR4P].
110 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, 148 F. Supp.
3d 563, 569 (E.D. La. 2015).
111 See, e.g., DEEPWATERHORIZON (Participant Media et al. 2016) (a semi-biographical retel-
ling of the oil spill, heavily critical of BP executives, released just six years after the event).
112 In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 573.
113 Id. (“$100 million for violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, $5.5 million for eleven
counts of seaman’s manslaughter, and $500,000 for one count of Obstruction of Congress.”).
114 BP, 2018 Ann. & Transition Rep. (Form 20-F) (Mar. 29, 2019) (BP files a 20-F and not
a 10-K because it is not a U.S. company).
115 Id.
116 BP, 2015 Ann. & Transition Rep. (Form 20-F) (Mar. 4, 2016) (from $108.66/barrel in
2013 to $52.39/barrel in 2015).
117 See Crude Oil Prices—70 Year Historical Chart, Macrotrends, https://www.macro
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compare BP’s 2013 profit of $23.8 billion to 2018’s $9.6 billion.118 In short,
BP’s profit decreases have been due to market factors, not to any envi-
ronmental sanctions.
Perhaps more telling is BP’s description of the worst oil spill in
history. In its 2011 financial disclosure, BP noted, unironically, that “the
oil industry in general, and in particular the US industry following the
Gulf of Mexico oil spill, faces increased regulation that could increase the
cost of regulatory compliance and limit our access to new exploration
properties.”119
To note, BP did identify the Gulf of Mexico oil spill first in its list
of financial risk factors in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.120 However, that
trend ended in 2015, and by 2018 the spill was no longer mentioned as
a risk factor.121 Further, of that $67 billion BP estimated it had paid, over
sixty percent went towards “litigation and claims costs,” while only forty
percent went towards the combined sum of “environmental costs,” “spill
response costs,” and “Clean Water Act penalties.”122 BP further noted, of
that sixty percent towards litigation and claims, “[t]hese costs relate pre-
dominantly to BEL [business economic loss] claims and associated admin-
istration costs.”123 In short, BP spent the great majority of its money on
other businesses who claimed the oil spill cost them money, and on paying
lawyers to litigate those claims, not on actual rehabilitative efforts.
Compare these litigation costs to the “Clean Water Act penalties”
BP incurred after it “released 134 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of
Mexico over a period of 87 days, fouling 1,300 miles of shoreline along five
states . . . [and] killed thousands of marine mammals and sea turtles, and
contaminated their habitats[;]” those penalties only represented approxi-
mately six percent of its lifetime costs associated with the oil spill.124 It
trends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart [https://perma.cc/T88R-FB3D]; BP, 2015 Ann.
& Transition Rep., supra note 116.
118 BP, 2013 Ann. & Transition Rep. (Form 20-F) (Mar. 6, 2014); 2018 Ann. & Transition
Rep., supra note 114.
119 BP, 2011 Ann. Rep. & Form 20-F, at 60, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business
-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/investors/bp-annual-report-and-form-20f-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SHK6-UAWZ].
120 2011 Ann. Report & Form 20-F, supra note 119; BP, 2012 Ann. & Transition Rep.
(Form 20-F) (Mar. 6, 2013); 2013 Ann. & Transition Rep., supra note 118; BP, 2014 Ann.
& Transition Rep. (Form 20-F) (Mar. 3, 2015).
121 2015 Ann. & Transition Rep., supra note 116; 2018 Ann. & Transition Rep., supra note
114.
122 2018 Ann. & Transition Rep., supra note 114.
123 Id.
124 Id.; Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Longterm Effects on Marine Mammals, Sea Turtles,
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is undisputable that its oil spill cost BP an enormous sum of money, but
it is also hard to dispute that the majority of this enormous sum was
earmarked for expenses that were unrelated to actually fixing the clear
and obvious destruction of so much of our environment. Even assuming,
arguendo, that BP feels deterred by this cost, that deterrence would
appear driven by the majority private settlements it incurred, and not
any actual EPA action.
Credit where due, it must be acknowledged that in its 2018
financial disclosure, BP’s chairman noted an industry priority to “play
our part in reducing greenhouse gas emissions” with “a progressive and
pragmatic approach.”125 No doubt in furtherance of this goal, and demon-
strating the true deterring effect of the EPA’s sanctions, BP announced
in October of 2018 that it was starting up its “Thunder Horse Northwest
Expansion” project, the largest oil platform in the Deepwater Gulf of
Mexico.126 Meanwhile, despite no longer being a financial risk factor to
BP, the toxic effects of its spill remain for the rest of us.127
A. Rethinking the Reactive Approach to Environmental Regulation
These examples are, of course, vulnerable to an accusation of
being cherry-picked, and not emblematic EPA efforts. While they were
certainly cherry-picked, this was due, instead, to their high-profile nature
and readily available financial disclosures. When pondering the success
of the EPA, consider that “air pollution worsened in the United States in
2017 and 2018 . . . after years of sustained improvement.”128 Further, the
United States is only ranked tenth globally in air quality by the World
Health Organization when measuring fine particulate pollution (PM2.5),
NOAA (Apr. 20, 2017), https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/apr17/dwh-protected-species
.html [https://perma.cc/YN67-F5NV].
125 2018 Ann. & Transition Rep., supra note 114.
126 Press Release, BP Starts Up Thunder Horse Northwest Expansion Ahead of Schedule
and Under Budget, BP (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and
-insights/press-releases/bp-starts-up-thunder-horse-northwest-expansion-ahead-of
-schedule-and-under-budget.html [https://perma.cc/9TFP-MLUC].
127 Darryl Fears, The Toxic Reach of Deepwater Horizon’s Oil Spill Was Much Larger—




128 Christopher Ingraham, Air Pollution Is Getting Worse, and Data Show More People
are Dying, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019
/10/23/air-pollution-is-getting-worse-data-show-more-people-are-dying/ [https://perma.cc
/6L4R-SPZ2].
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which is “a byproduct of burning and commonly comes from power plants,
car exhaust and wildfires.”129 PM2.5 “is particularly harmful to human
health, causing asthma and respiratory inflammation and increasing the
risk for lung cancer, heart attack and stroke.”130 Additionally, as of 2017,
the United States continues to be the second largest producer of carbon
dioxide in the world.131 Further, according to the American Society of Civil
Engineers (“ASCE”), America’s 2017 “Infrastructure Report Card” was a
cumulative D+.132 Notably, “53% of Americans live within 3 miles of a
hazardous waste site.”133 Consider also the existence of over 1,300 super-
fund sites within the United States as of 2019.134 These sites, caused by
“hazardous waste being dumped, left out in the open, or otherwise improp-
erly managed . . . include manufacturing facilities, processing plants,
landfills and mining sites.”135 Of those sites, over eighty-five percent have
been a “National Priority” for a decade or more.136 In short, while the
United States undeniably enjoys a high standard of living, that does not
imply it is the highest, nor that it cannot markedly improve.
The point of these examples is not to discredit the efforts of the
EPA. The fact that it is securing settlements at all indicates the EPA’s
sincere attempts to regulate the environment. However, these examples
do highlight the key parallel to the financial frauds of the 1990s to early
2000s: a reactive approach to deterrence. Companies are caught in wrong-
doing, participating in some type of environmental degradation, and pay
some type of remediation fee or civil penalty, or both. Regardless of the
remediation, and identical to the corporate fraud, the shareholder value
has already been lost: the environment has already been degraded. These
129 Nadja Popovich, America’s Skies Have Gotten Clearer, but Millions Still Breathe Un-
healthy Air, N.Y.TIMES (June 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/19
/climate/us-air-pollution-trump.html [https://perma.cc/DW56-ZUJ2].
130 Id.
131 Thomas C. Frohlich & Liz Blossom, These Countries Produce the Most CO2 Emissions,
USATODAY (July 14, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/07/14/china-us
-countries-that-produce-the-most-co-2-emissions/39548763/ [https://perma.cc/DGY5-G9WX].
132 America’s Infrastructure Grade, Am. Soc’y Civ. Eng’rs (2017), https://www.infrastruc
turereportcard.org/americas-grades/ [https://perma.cc/8LQB-K2D2].
133 2017 Infrastructure Report Card: Hazardous Waste, Am. Soc’y Civ. Eng’rs (2017), https://
www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Hazardous-Waste-Final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG54-T37Q].
134 Superfund National Priorities List (NPL) Sites—by Listing Date, EPA, https://www
.epa.gov/superfund/national-priorities-list-npl-sites-listing-date [https://perma.cc/S72G
-77NR] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
135 What is Superfund?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/what-superfund [https://
perma.cc/YJD7-ED99] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
136 Superfund National Priorities List (NPL) Sites—by Listing Date, supra note 134.
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reactive steps are not preventing the spoilage of the earth, they are simply
trying to quantify the damage and hope that the price tag can buy a large
enough Band-Aid to reverse the problem. This is the fundamental para-
digm that needs to be corrected. The EPA’s enforcement capabilities must
be enhanced so that its penalties pivot from being a post-incurred cost to
being a legitimate deterrence, which bears enough weight that companies,
and the actors within those companies, refrain from environmentally
degrading decisions.
B. Proposed Policy
As stated before, the myriad combinations of implementing policy
represent too great an endeavor for this Note to cover. It will, instead,
address the goals of the EPA equivalent to Sarbanes-Oxley (“EPA-SOX”)
and provide a skeleton of such a policy.
The EPA-SOX, just as its progenitor, must focus on deterrence.
This is made even more obvious when one considers that while the average
economic recession lasts for about 1.5 years and, cynically, involves the
valuation of fiat money (made valuable because we agree it is valuable),137
environmental damage can last indefinitely, and involves resources that
are literally required for life to exist.138
To that end, the focus of the EPA-SOX should be threefold: 1)
clearer and stronger corporate accountability regarding environmental
hazards; 2) enhanced criminal liability for environmental failures; and
3) expanded criminal liability for environmental failures.
The first of these prongs is the most important, and would pre-
sumably be utilized the most. In practice, this could look identical to the
current disclosures required for corporate financial statements. Essentially,
an executive would have to personally attest that their company was
following all EPA regulations at the risk of the company and themselves
being held liable.139 This would allow for direct accountability when
137 Cameron Keng, Recession is Overdue by 4.5 Years, Here’s How to Prepare, FORBES
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cameronkeng/2018/10/23/recession-is-over
due-by-4-5-years-heres-how-to-prepare/#426a4fc740d8 [https://perma.cc/Q9DQ-R5Q6].
138 See, e.g., Malcolm Burnley, The Environmental Scandal in Scott Pruitt’s Backyard,
POLITICO (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/12/06/scott-pruitt
-tar-creek-oklahoma-investigation-215854 [https://perma.cc/ZAW7-38W4] (discussing the
superfund site Tar Creek which has been in a superfund for over thirty years and still
remains heavily polluted).
139 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, supra note 25 (“[T]he principal executive officer or
officers and the principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar func-
tions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed [that they have reviewed the finan-
cials and that they are accurate].”).
2021] MOTHER NATURE NEEDS HER SOX 623
companies are found to be violating environmental regulations as well
as streamline judicial proceedings.140 Further, the prioritizing of “a short-
term focus, fueled by an obsession with quarter-to-quarter earnings” would
be counterbalanced by the knowledge that any environmental violations
would result in direct and personal liability.141 Executives would have to
put themselves on record that their companies were not violating envi-
ronmental standards or risk compounding any ongoing violation with
fraud and increased penalties.142
The second prong of the EPA-SOX is enhanced criminal liability.143
It is likely that prosecutors would rarely invoke these criminal penalties,
preferring to rely on the more readily available prosecution of fraud, but
their existence would still act as a deterrent.144
To explain this reasoning by analogy, consider that the elements
to proving felon in possession of a firearm145 are much easier than proving
the alleged offense of, for example, robbery.146 In this case, the first prong
(certification) will replicate that easier burden (an executive certified
their company was complying with environmental regulations; company
was not complying with environmental regulations). The enhanced criminal
liability therefore appears much more like a Sword of Damocles, to be used
in exceptionally egregious cases, and/or to set an example.147 In essence,
140 Proving an executive 1) certified their company was following environmental regula-
tions; and 2) that the company actually was not violating any regulations would presumedly
improve efficiency since half the elements are proved at the outset.
141 Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 24 (describing the economic con-
ditions that led to the economic scandals prompting Sarbanes-Oxley).
142 It should be noted that this act, along with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, would only hang
over publicly traded companies. However, given that a large portion (if not a majority)
of polluters are investor-owned, this does not seem like a concession. See, e.g., Suzanne
Goldenberg, Just 90 Companies Caused Two-Thirds of Man-Made Global Warming Emis-
sions, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/20
/90-companies-man-made-global-warming-emissions-climate-change [https://perma.cc
/Q7JA-PFHR] (in 2013, fifty of the top ninety carbon-polluters were investor owned).
143 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 903–06, supra note 25 (enhancing the penalty for mail
fraud from five years to twenty, stating that willfully certifying false reports can result
in fines and/or imprisonment of up to twenty years, etc.).
144 See Drawbaugh & Aubin, supra note 64 (noting that in the first ten years of Sarbanes-
Oxley, few criminal charges were brought).
145 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
convicted [of a felony to] . . . possess . . . any firearm . . . .”).
146 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 2112 (federal statute on robbery whose elements include proving
all the elements of larceny in addition to force or the threat of force).
147 See, e.g., Press Release, Former CFO of Vancouver Business Management Company In-
dicted for Certifying False Financial Reports, DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www
.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/former-cfo-vancouver-business-management-company-indicted
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prong two acts as a looming deterrent, but agency efficiency will likely
militate towards settlements based on violations of prong one.
The final prong of the EPA-SOX is expanded criminal liability.
This is where the act will deviate most from Sarbanes-Oxley due to the
different nature of environmental regulations versus financial regula-
tions. While Sarbanes-Oxley expanded mail fraud, wire fraud, and other
essentially securities focused crimes, the EPA-SOX would do the same
in the environmental arena.148 Such crimes would necessarily be properly
determined by the EPA itself, but, to provide an instructive example, con-
sider the inclusion of such things as waste released into public water-
ways, emissions violations, or failures regarding restoration promises.
I remain intentionally vague on prong three because its purpose is
akin to that of prong two: looming deterrence. I consider it a catch-all to
strengthen the enhanced criminal liability by addressing additional crimes.
In practice, prongs two and three could likely be concatenated, but they
remain distinct in this Note to explicitly annunciate their existence and
the need to ensure a full-bodied set of criminal rules to ensure compliance.
It must be noted that there is an implicit assumption in these
rules that the EPA will not become beholden to the very industries it
seeks to regulate.149 Since this is an existential risk all agencies face, any
included treatise on how to prevent agency capture would be woefully
incomplete, so it will have to suffice to simply acknowledge it as a risk.150
C. Deterrence in Action
With the skeleton of the EPA-SOX defined, consider again the
cases of Volkswagen, GE, and BP.151
-certifying-false-financial [https://perma.cc/5GU8-5HQL] (example of criminal charges
brought against CFO who violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, among others).
148 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 25 (enumerating multiple actions that
represent an expansion of white-collar criminal liability).
149 See, e.g., Hilary Lambert, Whose Water Is It?, 75 AM.J.ECON.&SOCIO. 682 (May 2016)
(describing the (in)famous “Halliburton Loophole” instituted in 2005 during the Bush-
Cheney administration that exempted fracking from the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
Safe Drinking Water Act and others, essentially sidelining the EPA; so named because
Dick Cheney was the former CEO of Halliburton).
150 To paraphrase Justice Stewart, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds
of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.” Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
151 See supra notes 89–127 and accompanying text.
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In Volkswagen’s case, former CEO Martin Winterkorn, who was
indicted in 2018, “repeatedly denied wrongdoing.”152 His stance reflected
the general response of Volkswagen’s executives, that this multiyear fraud
was, somehow, perpetuated without the blessing or knowledge of its man-
agement.153 In a world where Mr. Winterkorn was required to formally
attest each year that his company was complying with EPA regulations,
this defense would, while patently absurd in either case, be much easier
to overcome. Moving into the realm of speculation, the knowledge that he
was personally making himself and the company liable for fines and even
potential imprisonment, would likely (hopefully) have put a damper on
any perceived value from violating pollution standards.
Next, consider GE, who explicitly noted its environmental costs
and considered them a “remediation action” to be accounted for annually.154
As noted above, polluting the environment and then earmarking it as a cost
may work as a financial exercise, but the degradation has already occurred.
Under the EPA-SOX, the EPA would have the tools to more stringently en-
force its rules, with the goal of moving from reactive fines to deterrence.
In GE’s case, the EPA might even need to consider invoking criminal
penalties given GE’s glib acknowledgment of environmental pollution.
Armed with EPA-SOX, the agency could change the paradigm of environ-
mental sanctions from a cost of doing business to a business risk not
worth incurring.
Lastly, consider BP’s oil spill. The vast majority of BP’s costs went
towards litigation and claims, not towards actual environmental improve-
ments.155 Armed with a more efficient regulatory statute, the EPA could
press criminal charges against BP’s executives. The purpose of this display
is twofold: 1) as a bellwether to other companies about the cost of engag-
ing in environmentally degrading business ventures; and 2) to empower
the EPA to enforce a stronger monetary fine to address the pollution.
In summing up the case studies, the great irony of EPA-SOX is,
unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it should require no implementation costs
to regulated industries.156 Businesses are already supposed to follow EPA
152 Jack Ewing, Ex-Volkswagen C.E.O. Charged with Fraud Over Diesel Emissions, N.Y.
TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/business/volkswagen-ceo
-diesel-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/LX7H-5PNV].
153 Id.
154 Gen. Elec., 2015 Ann. Rep., supra note 106.
155 See supra notes 109–27 and accompanying text.
156 See UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SOX COMPLIANCE, Protiviti (2016),
at 1, https://www.protiviti.com/sites/default/files/united_states/insights/2016-sox-survey
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regulations (that apply to them). Requiring that their executives reiter-
ate this by affirming it in a written disclosure adds no overhead. Of
course, those businesses that feel they need to improve their environ-
mental adherences before attesting to such a document might incur
money, but this can hardly be called an unforeseen cost. To reiterate, the
regulations the businesses would need to follow (and currently need to
follow) do not expand in the slightest. Only the mechanisms to punish
those who do not currently follow those regulations are enlarged. The
inevitable lobbying against an EPA-SOX statute would have to navigate
the straits of claiming to already be fully compliant, while also refusing
to certify that very compliance.
Finally, consider, in general terms, the massive cost of litigation
surrounding EPA enforcement actions. This investment represents money
that is, by definition, not going towards fixing the environment, and the
litigation itself greatly slows the response time to company-made envi-
ronmental disasters.157 By requiring certification that companies are
complying with environmental regulations, the EPA-SOX would create
a de-facto strict liability standard that would streamline litigation and
have a strong deterring effect.158
CONCLUSION
The EPA is not an effective deterrence to the pollution and degra-
dation of the environment. Its regulations are treated as a cost of doing
business, if not simply ignored. Given the precarious state that our en-
vironment is in, the time has come to equip the EPA with the tools to
actually enforce its mandate. By imbuing in the EPA the same power that
was bestowed on the SEC via Sarbanes-Oxley, the agency might finally
be positioned to actually “protect human health by safeguarding the air
we breathe, water we drink and land on which we live.”159
-protiviti.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJM5-M4NS] (detailing the high cost of compliance to
Sarbanes-Oxley).
157 See, e.g., In re Oil Spill, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 573 (2010 oil spill resulted in civil settlement
approximately five years later).
158 See Daniel Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199 (2013)
(one of the best crime deterrents is perceived certainty of punishment).
159 Milestones in EPA and Environmental History, supra note 1.
